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ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN 
THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. 
COLL. OF IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 




 “If a problem can't be solved within the frame it was conceived, 
the solution lies in reframing the problem.”1 
 
This article centers on the Seventh Circuit decision, Hively 
v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll., which became the first U.S. Circuit 
decision to declare that sexual orientation discrimination is a type 
of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  The introduction highlights the difficulty in defining sex 
discrimination and provides an overview of the various approaches 
taken to try and define it.  Part II provides background information 
on how sex discrimination became a part of Title VII, the 
development of sex discrimination through the courts, the changes 
in the Supreme Court’s understanding of sexual orientation, and 
the EEOC’s decision to expand sex discrimination.  Part III 
provides the facts surrounding Hively and an explanation of its 
various opinions.  Part IV critiques the Seventh Circuit’s 
arguments because, while the decision correctly determines that 
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, it 
fails to provide a new framework in which to make this 
determination, making it difficult for other courts to apply the 
decision’s rationale.  Finally, Part V discusses the impact of Hively 
and posits that, while the decision adds to the increasing number of 
voices for sexual orientation protection under Title VII, it may 
ultimately hinder that goal through its limited change in 
methodology for determining what constitutes sex discrimination.   
                                                
1 BRIAN MCGREEVY, HEMLOCK GROVE 107 (2012).  
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I. CONSTRUCTING SEX DISCRIMINATION: INTRODUCTION 
TO TITLE VII AND THE COURTS’ APPROACHES TO SEX 
DISCRIMINATION    
 
 Imagine you are an airline stewardess in the 1960s and you 
just got engaged.2  On what should be a joyful day, your employer 
tells you that you will no longer be able to work for the airline 
because their policy is that only unmarried women can work as a 
stewardess.3  At the time, you would not have been able to claim 
employment discrimination because the employment policy did 
not “technically” discriminate on the basis of sex as it did not 
divide men and women into two groups.4  When stewardesses 
brought their sex discrimination claims, the airlines argued that 
being unmarried was a legitimate job requirement because their 
passengers (mostly male) preferred unmarried stewardesses; 
moreover, married stewardesses would create administrative 
burdens due to their home life demands.5  When this social policy 
argument failed, in large part because of the rise of the women’s 
movement, the airlines posited a new theory: the policy 
                                                
2 See generally Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex 
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1348–54 (2012) (explaining battle 
over whether airline policies that terminated employment when 
stewardesses married or reached their early thirties constituted actionable 
discrimination based on sex or benign discrimination based on age and 
marital status).   
3 See id. (explaining basis of hypothetical); see also id. at 1353 (quoting 
statement made by airline representative during EEOC testimony on 
stewardess issue stating that EEOC “has no authority to act in respect to 
complaints which are in fact based upon considerations of anything other 
than race, creed, color, nationality [sic] origin and sex”). 
4 See supra note 2 (explaining basis of hypothetical); see also Franklin, 
supra note 2, at 1353 (citing to court decision which held that airline 
policies did not constitute discrimination because policy did not divide 
employees into two perfectly sex-differentiated groups).   
5 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1349 (stating that airlines argued that hiring 
only young, single women as stewardesses was a legitimate business 
requirement because of passenger preference, of fear that husbands would 
call office to ask about wives, and that women would be unable to balance 
home and job).   
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discriminated based on marital status, not sex, because the policy 
did not sort men and women according to sex.6  The courts began 
to utilize this argument as a possible test for determining sex 
discrimination.7  Yet courts quickly stripped the normative 
analysis in sex discrimination determinations, describing the test 
as an objective rule that does not require additional value 
judgments.8  In doing so, the courts ignored the complexity of sex 
discrimination and prevented individuals like the stewardesses 
from bringing successful sex discrimination claims.9   
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is illegal 
for an employer to terminate employment or refuse to hire an 
individual based on the individual’s sex.10  This statute provides a 
                                                
6 See id. at 1351–52 (noting that airlines began to change argument to one 
where policies were age and marital status discrimination).   
7 See id. at 1353 (highlighting first federal case that dealt with suit brought 
by stewardesses wherein court determined that policies did not count as sex 
discrimination because they did not divide men and women into two 
different groups but also rested decision on normative reasons); see also id. 
at 1354–55 (explaining the 5th Circuit’s decisions to use anti-classification 
reasoning while also utilizing normative arguments about sex and family 
roles).    
8 See id. at 1353 (explaining that less than a decade after first federal case, 
Supreme Court no longer rested its decision on normative arguments but 
rather on objective rule without value judgments).   
9 See id. at 1353–54 (arguing that courts used anti-classification approach to 
mask that determinations were based on social judgment about gender-based 
regulation); see id. at 1335 (noting that no one at EEOC after Title VII was 
enacted had comparable experience in women’s rights nor did employees 
expect to work in sex discrimination field); see also id. at 1338 (citing 
EEOC Commissioner’s statement that “the sex provision of Title VII is 
mysterious and difficult to understand and control”).    
10 See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000(e)–2(a) (2017) (“Employer Practices.  It shall be unlawful employment 
practice for an employer -- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
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needed cause of action for many but gives rise to the question of 
“what is sex discrimination?”11  The courts have changed their 
answer to this question several times but traditionally defined it as 
discrimination “against women because they are women and 
against men because they are men.”12  Sex, the court added, meant 
biologically female or male.13  Until recently, the federal courts 
agreed with this “traditional” definition of sex discrimination and 
consistently excluded sexual orientation claims, arguing that 
sexual orientation and sex are two different characteristics.14  
                                                                                                         
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”).  
11 See Sex Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining sex discrimination as “discrimination based on gender, esp. 
against women. . . .  The terminology is gradually shifting. Increasingly in 
medicine and sociology, gender is distinguished from sex.  Gender refers to 
the psychological and societal aspects of being male or female; sex refers 
specifically to the physical aspects.”).  Compare Sex, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining sex as “1. The sum of the 
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female 
organism; gender; 2. Sexual intercourse”), with AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, APA 
DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOL. (2d ed. 2015) (defining sex as “(1) the traits that 
distinguish between males and females.  Sex refers especially to physical 
and biological traits, whereas gender refers especially to social or cultural 
traits, although the distinction between the two terms is not regularly 
observed; (2) the physiological and psychological processes related to 
procreation and erotic pleasure.”).  
12 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); see 
also Franklin, supra note 2, at 1315 (defining the traditional concept of sex 
discrimination as “the idea that employer conduct is discriminatory only and 
whenever it bifurcates employees along biological sex lines”).   
13 See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (holding that sex means biologically male or 
female until Congress decides otherwise).  Compare supra note 11 
(explaining different definitions of sex and gender), with Hively v. Ivy Tech. 
Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 353 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (concluding that sex means both gender and sexual orientation).  
14 See infra note 76 (discussing precedent in other circuit courts which use 
“traditional” concept of sex discrimination and hold that sexual orientation 
claims are not actionable under Title VII).  But cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (arguing that “[t]he case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and note merely in that of 
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Regardless, the Supreme Court has gradually re-interpreted sex 
discrimination to include other less “traditional” understandings of 
sex discrimination.15  Most notably, in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, the Supreme Court found that sex stereotyping16 was a 
form of sex discrimination because determining that a female 
employee should not be aggressive is a sex-conscious decision.17     
The Court’s decision to include sex stereotyping as a form 
of sex discrimination opened the door to previously barred sexual 
orientation discrimination18 claims.19  Struggling to 
compartmentalize the two claims, some courts barred any claims 
with a sexual orientation component, while others attempted to 
                                                                                                         
what was said a hundred years ago . . . .  We must consider what this 
country has become in deciding what the amendment has reserved.”).   
15 See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the 
Supreme Court found that sex discrimination covered other situations 
besides “traditional” concept).  
16 See HILARY M. LIPS, SEX AND GENDER: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (6th ed. 
2017) (defining sex stereotyping as “socially shared beliefs about what 
qualities can be assigned to individuals based on their membership in the 
male or female half of the human race.”).  
17 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(asserting that “[i]n saying that gender played a motivating part in an 
employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the 
moment of the decision what its reasons were . . ., one of those reasons 
would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.  In the specific 
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief 
that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.”).  
18 See Sexual Orientation Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining it as “[d]iscrimination based on a person's 
predisposition or inclination to be romantically or sexually attracted to a 
certain type of person (i.e., heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or 
asexuality), or based on a person's gender identity (i.e., a person's internal 
sense of gender).”). 
19 See Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 
2016) (explaining Seventh Circuit’s precedent that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not actionable under Title VII); see also id. at 705 (noting 
that after Price Waterhouse there was a line of cases brought by gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual employees who framed argument in 
gender non-conformity terms).  
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parse out facts supporting a sex discrimination claim from those 
supporting a sexual orientation claim, and then only looking at the 
sex discrimination claim.20  However, in doing so, the courts 
created a bizarre situation where gay persons21 who “looked gay”22 
could bring successful sex stereotyping claims, while gay persons 
who were known to be gay but did not exhibit “gay 
characteristics”23 could not.24   
Then in 2017, the Seventh Circuit broke away from its 
precedent and included sexual orientation discrimination as 
prohibited under Title VII.25  In Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of 
Ind., where an openly gay woman brought a sex discrimination 
case against her employer alleging sexual orientation 
discrimination, the Seventh Circuit held that sexual orientation 
                                                
20 See infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text (discussing other circuits’ 
approaches to sexual orientation in sex discrimination claims).  
21 Throughout my Note, I utilize the term “gay persons” in reference to 
individuals, both male and female, who are sexually attracted to individuals 
of his or her respective sexes.  See Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns 
American Psychological Association, Avoiding Heterosexual Bias in 
Language, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 9, 973–74 (1991) (recommending the use 
of the terms “lesbian, gay, or gay persons” as opposed to “homosexual” 
because of its connection with negative stereotypes).   
22 See Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for 
Title VII, 63 AM. U.L. REV. 715, 717 (2014) (arguing that gay persons are 
protected when their sexuality is perceivable via the senses as something 
that can be literally seen or heard).  In his article, Brian Soucek utilizes this 
term to highlight the difference between gay persons who are perceived by 
others to be gay from those who are known to be gay.  Here, individuals 
who “look gay” are those who have a better chance of bringing a successful 
gender non-conformity claim.        
23 See id. at 748–49 (providing sample of characteristics that courts have 
determined violate gender stereotypes including hairstyle, way of walking, 
way of talking, and appearance with most being noticed in connection with 
idea that individual is not acting manly enough or is acting too feminine).   
24 See id. at 716 (explaining that if you look gay at work you may be able to 
bring a claim, but if employers only know that you are gay, then you are 
unprotected under Title VII).  
25 For a further discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s precedent see infra notes 
78–81 and accompanying text; see also Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of 
Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual orientation 
discrimination falls under sex discrimination).   
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discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII because sexual 
orientation discrimination necessarily involves thinking about 
sex.26  The majority determined that there are three perspectives 
that justify, including sexual orientation discrimination under sex 
discrimination.27  Although Hively expanded sex discrimination to 
include sexual orientation discrimination and thereby fixed the 
arbitrary distinction between looking gay and being gay, the four 
opinions highlight the difficulty that courts still face when 
interpreting sex discrimination under Title VII.28   
This Note discusses the development of sex discrimination 
under Title VII and argues that while the Seventh Circuit correctly 
held that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination, the court did so using incorrect arguments; rather 
than adopting a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation that 
melds gender non-conformity cases with developments in our 
understanding of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, the court 
continued to view sex discrimination in the same anti-
classification way29 that was originally used to limit the scope of 
                                                
26 See Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 350 (7th Cir. 
2017) (stating that “[i]t would require considerable calisthenics to remove 
the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’”); see also id. at 341 (providing factual 
background of case).  
27 See infra notes 123–141 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
majority’s three perspectives on sexual orientation discrimination.   
28 See generally Hively, 853 F.3d at 339 (recognizing that there is a 
majority, two concurring, and dissenting opinion);  see also infra notes 108–
115 and accompanying text (highlighting importance of majority’s 
interpretive framework); e.g., infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text 
(noting type of interpretation that Judge Posner’s concurrence uses); infra 
notes 160–163  and accompanying text (noting type of interpretation that 
Judge Flaum’s concurrence uses); infra notes 167–172 and accompanying 
text (noting type of interpretation that Judge Sykes’s dissent uses).     
29 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1309 (defining anti-classification in relation 
to sex discrimination as “divid[ing] men and women into two groups, 
perfectly differentiated along biological sex lines”); see also Jack M. Balkin 
& Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification 
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (stating that the 
anti-classification “principle holds that the government may not classify 
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sex discrimination.30  Part II summarizes the history of Title VII’s 
sex provision, as well as federal courts’ and the EEOC’s 
interpretation of sex discrimination.31  Next, Part III provides the 
facts of Hively, while Part IV recounts Hively’s various opinions 
and approaches to defining sex discrimination.32  Part V critiques 
Hively’s interpretative methods, and, finally, Part VI notes that, 
due in part to Hively’s arguments, there remains uncertainty for 
employers and employees, while also creating confusion about 
how to understand sex discrimination in future cases.33              
II. WALKING THE TIGHTROPE: APPROACHES TO 
SEPARATING SEX AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION   
 
Hively’s place in sex discrimination jurisprudence is 
underpinned by Title VII, historical debate, Supreme Court 
decisions both on Title VII and on sexual orientation generally, 
circuit courts’ differing opinions, and the EEOC.34  Historically, 
                                                                                                         
people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: 
for example, their race.”).   
30 For further discussion of the Hively opinions’ struggle with interpretive 
framework, see infra notes 182–221 and accompanying text; see also 
Franklin, supra note 2, at 1316 (asserting that “[t]alk of deference to the 
legislature and fidelity to tradition replaced discussion of the need to 
preserve the traditional family and women’s role within in . . . .  Courts’ 
continued adherence to the ‘traditional concept’ of sex discrimination 
significantly limits Title VII’s scope and insulates from judicial scrutiny 
various forms of regulation that maintains social stratification.”).      
31 See infra notes 34–89 and accompanying text.  
32 See infra notes 90–181 and accompanying text for Part III; see infra notes 
182–232 and accompanying text for Part IV.   
33 See infra notes 233–249 and accompanying text for Part V; see infra 
notes 250–257 and accompanying text for Part VI.  
34 For discussion of Title VII and the historical debate surrounding it, see 
infra notes 44–56 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of 
Supreme Court decisions, see infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text.  
For further discussion of circuit court opinions, see infra notes 68–81  and 
accompanying text.  For further discussion of EEOC’s viewpoint, see infra 
notes 83–89 and accompanying text.  
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Title VII did not provide protection for sexual orientation claims.35  
This occurred in large part because of the courts’ adoption of an 
anti-classification approach, which transformed interpreting sex 
discrimination from a dynamic statutory interpretation36 approach 
to a focus on formal logic.37  The historic interpretation changed 
when the Supreme Court expanded sex discrimination to include, 
most notably, sexual harassment and sex stereotyping claims.38  
Regardless of sex discrimination’s expanded definition, the circuit 
courts refused to expand it to sexual orientation discrimination, 
using various types of interpretive methods such as legislative 
intent, common meaning at the time of enactment, and logical 
reasoning to support their decisions.39  Despite this, gay persons 
started to bring successful claims under sex stereotyping because 
employers viewed the employees’ mannerisms as being contrary to 
societal norms about how a person of a particular sex should 
behave, i.e., a gay man as acting effeminately or a gay woman as 
acting manly.40  In response, the EEOC determined that sexual 
                                                
35 See infra note 76 for precedent in circuit courts holding that sexual 
orientation discrimination does not fall under Title VII.  
36 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (1987) (defining dynamic statutory interpretation as 
“the process of understanding a text created in the past and applying it to a 
present problem.”); see generally id. at 1482–97 (positing his cautious 
model of dynamic statutory interpretation).   
37 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1378–80 (concluding that the traditional 
concept of sex discrimination is used to limit reach of sex discrimination so 
that sexual minorities cannot bring claims); see also Balkin & Siegel, supra 
note 29, at 10 (explaining the anti-classification argument); cf. Suzanne 
Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) 
(discussing how the comparator method limits the definition of 
discrimination and prevents actual cases of discrimination from succeeding).  
38 For further discussion of Supreme Court decisions expanding sex 
discrimination, see infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.  
39 For further discussion of how courts have attempted to limit reach of sex 
discrimination, see infra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.  
40 See infra note 76 (citing cases where courts try to draw a line between 
gender non-conformity and sexual orientation discrimination claims).  
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orientation discrimination does fall under Title VII.41  In Hively, 
the Seventh Circuit used the EEOC’s arguments to find that sexual 
orientation is protected under Title VII.42  While a circuit court 
splitting decision, Hively followed suit with a growing trend of 
district court cases and with the EEOC’s opinion on the issue.43   
A. Looking Back: The Historical Debate on Interpreting Sex 
Discrimination 
 
Under Title VII, employers cannot discriminate on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.44  However, 
when Title VII was enacted, its focus was on race discrimination.45  
In fact, sex as a protected class was added to the bill days before it 
passed as an attempt to thwart its passing.46  Thus, there was little 
                                                
41 For further discussion of EEOC’s opinions on sexual orientation 
discrimination, see infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.  
42 See Part IV infra notes 99–181 and accompanying text for discussion of 
Hively opinion.   
43 See Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Schs., 221 F. Supp. 3d 255, 267-68 (D. 
Conn. 2016) (holding that plaintiff has Title VII claim under associational 
discrimination and thinks sexual orientation cannot be separated from sex); 
see, e.g., U.S. EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., P.C., 217 F. Supp. 3d 834, 
839 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (holding that sex discrimination prohibits 
discrimination based on sexual orientation because when asking question 
“whether, but for Mr. Baxley’s sex, would he have been subjected to this 
discrimination or harassment,” the answer is no); Winstead v. Lafayette 
Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1343–46 (N.D. Fla. 2016) 
(determining that while sexual orientation discrimination is not necessarily 
sex discrimination under EEOC’s argument that sexual orientation cannot 
be understood without reference to sex, it is necessarily sex discrimination 
under gender stereotype discrimination).  But cf. infra notes 82–89 and 
accompanying text for EEOC’s reasoning.  
44 See supra note 10 (quoting relevant language of Title VII).  
45 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1334 (depicting EEOC’s focus on preparing 
for race discrimination cases, but that EEOC was caught off guard when 
more than a third of claims were about sex discrimination).  
46 See id. at 1317–18 (noting that the proposal to add “sex” to Title VII was 
made at last minute, and there was very little discussion on the matter); see 
generally 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964) (noting that when Rep. Smith 
recommended adding “sex” to Title VII, the legislative debate was almost 
over which has been understood as a last-ditch attempt to stop bill).  The 
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to no discussion about what sex discrimination claims would 
entail.47  Regardless, after Title VII’s enactment, there was 
significant debate regarding what kind of claims fell under sex 
discrimination.48  Legislators, women’s groups, politicians, and the 
EEOC all weighed in on what claims sex discrimination covered.49  
At the heart of this debate was the effect these claims would have 
on traditional sex and family roles.50  This debate influenced how 
the EEOC and the courts applied the Title VII sex provision, with 
the EEOC eventually expanding sex discrimination to protect 
pregnancy discrimination and protective labor legislation, and with 
the courts developing jurisprudence that focused on normative 
judgments and stereotypes rather than an anti-classification 
approach i.e., determining discrimination based on categories not 
policy.51         
                                                                                                         
court in Ulane emphasized the fact that the term “sex” was added to Title 
VII one day before the House approved the statute in an attempt to stop it.  
See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(describing Title VII’s legislative history and how Congress was concerned 
with race discrimination not sex discrimination). 
47 Compare Franklin, supra note 2, at 1318–19 (stating that “[t]he 
documentary record is meager: one afternoon of debate, no committee 
reports or legislative hearings.”), with Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085–86 (detailing 
the “total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled 
with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption” as proof that 
“Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind”), and Eskridge, supra note 36, 
at 1489 (noting that Title VII does not define “discriminate” and that “Title 
VII was obviously not drafted with a coherent vision of discrimination in 
mind . . .”).    
48 See generally Franklin, supra note 2, at 1319–54 (highlighting history of 
sex discrimination debate including legislator’s opinions, airline’s opinion, 
feminist’s opinions, and courts’ opinions during the years after Title VII’s 
enactment).  
49 See supra note 48 and accompanying text for discussion of historical 
debate; see also Franklin, supra note 2, at 1345 (discussing the campaign by 
National Organization for Women to redefine sex discrimination).  
50 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1322 (noting that legislators who opposed 
adding sex discrimination were afraid that it would regulate traditional sex 
and family roles). 
51 See id. at 1345 (discussing EEOC’s 1972 guidelines which found that 
pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination and guidelines which 
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Despite the ongoing debate into sex stereotypes and social 
roles, the “traditional” concept of sex discrimination primarily 
took hold in the Supreme Court case Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
wherein the Court held that pregnancy discrimination was not 
discrimination under Title VII because it did not divide men and 
women into separate groups.52  Under this anti-classification 
approach, the way to determine if sex discrimination occurred is to 
test whether the practice separated employees into a male group or 
a female group, with no overlap.53  If so, then there was sex 
discrimination.54  After the Gilbert decision, there was little debate 
in the courts about how to interpret sex discrimination.55  
However, this “traditional” concept of sex discrimination does not 
reflect the decades of debate that occurred on what sex 
discrimination should cover.56   
 
B. Inching Forward: Supreme Court Expands Title VII 
 
Despite largely following the “traditional” anti-
classification approach, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning 
                                                                                                         
found that state protective laws violated Title VII); see also id. at 1354–57 
(analyzing cases where courts used comparative method but were actually 
relying on normative judgment and social issues).  Compare Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp, 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969) (upholding policy that 
barred mothers, but not fathers, with preschool-age children because of “the 
differences between the normal relationships of working fathers and 
working mothers to their preschool-age children.”), with Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (asserting that Title VII 
is supposed to prevent discrimination “resulting from sex stereotypes” and 
to “eliminate...irrational impediments to job opportunities and enjoyment 
which have plagued women in the past.”).   
52 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 at 134 (1976); see Franklin, 
supra note 2, at 1353 (citing to Gilbert’s holding).   
53 See supra note 29 for Franklin’s and Balkin & Siegal’s definition of anti-
classification.  
54 For Gilbert’s reasoning, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.    
55 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1311 (noting that the “traditional concept” 
of sex discrimination “continues to exert a regulative influence over the 
law” and makes plaintiffs identify comparators).  
56 See id. at 1329–47 (summarizing different arguments about what sex 
discrimination covered).  
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of sex discrimination to include more than the “traditional” 
meaning as exemplified in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., which 
held that “it is unlawful to discriminate against women because 
they are women and against men because they are men,” with sex 
meaning biologically female or male.57  The Court determined that 
sexual harassment, same-sex harassment, and actuarial 
assumptions on longevity based on sex are all forms of sex 
discrimination.58  Regardless of the strict anti-classification 
approach, in Price Waterhouse, the Court found that Title VII 
prohibits sex stereotyping.59  There a woman was fired, in part, 
because of her aggressive characteristics that some of the partners 
viewed as unfeminine.60 She was told to dress and act more 
femininely in order to enhance her chances of promotion.61  The 
                                                
57 Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
58 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–82 
(1998) (holding that sexual harassment discrimination extends to same-sex 
harassment and that the harasser does not need to be homosexual, but rather 
the harasser is motivated by hostility to presence of victim’s sex in 
workplace); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that sex discrimination includes failure 
to conform to gender stereotypes); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that sex discrimination includes 
sexual harassment); see also Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water and Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 715 (1978) (holding that sex discrimination reaches 
discrimination based on actuarial assumptions about a person’s longevity).  
59 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion) (asserting that 
“[i]n saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were . . . one of those reasons would be that the 
applicant or employee was a woman.  In the specific context of sex 
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”).  
60 For the facts of Price Waterhouse, see infra note 61. 
61 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion) (recounting that 
one of the partners recommended that she “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry”).  Other partners also used gendered language in her 
evaluations.  See id. (describing her as “macho” and recommending that she 
take “a course in charm school”); see also id. (suggesting that she 
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Court found that this type of behavior falls under sex 
discrimination because “an employer who acts on the basis of a 
belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, 
has acted on the basis of gender.”62  
 
C. Getting Closer: Supreme Court’s Understanding of 
Sexual Orientation in Constitutional Context 
 
The Supreme Court has also decided sexual orientation 
issues in other legal contexts, and, in recent years, the Court has 
expanded gay people’s rights.63  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court 
found that a state statute, the Defense Against Marriage Act, 
criminalizing homosexual intimacy violated the Due Process 
Clause.64  In addition, the Court held that the statute violated Due 
Process because its definition of spouse excluded same-sex 
partners.65  Most notably, same-sex couples now have the right to 
marry.66  According to the Supreme Court, the laws in these cases 
                                                                                                         
“overcompensated for being a woman” and criticizing her use of profanity 
which was viewed as more shocking coming from a lady).     
62 Id. at 288.  See also id. (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in 
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable 
and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out 
of a job if they do not.”).   
63 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding that 14th 
Amendment protected right to marry as fundamental liberty right); see, e.g., 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (finding that the portion 
of Defense of Marriage Act that excluded same-sex partners from “spouse” 
definition violated Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Lawrence v. 
Texas 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that Texas statute criminalizing 
homosexual sex violated Due Process Clause).   
64 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (holding that “a law 
branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral 
disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs 
contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, 
under any standard of review.”).  
65 See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770 (finding that the portion of Defense of 
Marriage Act that excluded same-sex partners from “spouse” definition 
violated Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).  
66 See Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2604 (noting that “[t]hese considerations lead 
to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in 
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created inequality because they prevented same-sex couples from 
enjoying the same rights as heterosexual couples.67   
 
D. Looking Back: Is Sexual Orientation a Stereotype?: 
Circuit Courts’ Confusion Between Stereotypes and 
Sexual Orientation 
 
Other courts have struggled and continue to struggle with 
distinguishing between sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
stereotyping claims.68  While courts recognize this difficulty, their 
attempts to draw a line in the sand have created more confusion as 
to what type of actions are discriminatory.69  For many courts, the 
                                                                                                         
the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be 
deprived of that right and that liberty.”).    
67 See id. at 2604 (stating that “[t]here is no difference between same- and 
opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle.  Yet by virtue of their 
exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the 
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage.  This harm 
results in more than just material burdens.  Same-sex couples are consigned 
to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their 
own lives.  As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the 
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of 
teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects.  It 
demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central 
institution of the Nation’s society. Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the 
transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest 
meaning.”).  
68 For a further discussion of the confusion courts have experienced in 
parsing out the two claims, see infra notes 69–76 and accompanying text.   
69 See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3rd Cir. 2009) 
(“The line between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination 
based on sex can be difficult to draw.”).  Courts have tried various ways to 
tease apart the two concepts.  See Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 
830 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that some courts disallow claims 
where sexual orientation and gender non-conformity are together, some bar 
all claims from gay/lesbian employees, and others try to separate two types 
of claims to focus only on gender non-conformity allegations), rev’d and 
remanded, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017); accord Soucek, supra note 22, at 
716 (illustrating that courts have created legal landscape where plaintiffs 
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distinguishing factor is how the claim itself is presented.70  If a 
claim provides facts that highlight a person’s perceivable gender 
non-conformity behavior,71 then it is a sex stereotyping case and 
the person’s sexual orientation is not relevant to the legal 
argument.72  Courts have identified characteristics such as how one 
                                                                                                         
who “look gay” have claims under Title VII while those who are not 
perceived to be homosexual but are known to be so rarely have claims).  
70 See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (indicating that claims that 
highlight sexual orientation facts fail while claims that highlight perceivable 
sex stereotype facts are more likely to proceed). 
71 See supra note 16 for definition of sex stereotyping.  Certain courts use 
the phrase “gender non-conformity” as opposed to “sex stereotyping,” but, 
for the purposes of this note, they indicate the same situation.   
72 Compare Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292 (“Prowel was harassed because he did 
not conform to his employer’s vision of how a man should look, speak, and 
act – rather than harassment based solely on his sexual orientation.  To be 
sure, the District Court correctly noted that the record is replete with 
evidence of harassment motivated by Prowel's sexual orientation. Thus, it is 
possible that the harassment Prowel alleges was because of his sexual 
orientation, not his effeminacy. Nevertheless, this does not vitiate the 
possibility that Prowel was also harassed for his failure to conform to gender 
stereotypes.”).  In Prowel, the plaintiff described himself as having “a high 
voice and did not curse; was very well-groomed; wore what others would 
consider dressy clothes; was neat; filed his nails instead of ripping them off 
with a utility knife; crossed his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot 
‘the way a woman would sit’; walked and carried himself in an effeminate 
manner; drove a clean car; had a rainbow decal on the trunk of his car; 
talked about things like art, music, interior design, and decor; and pushed 
the buttons on the nail encoder with ‘pizzazz.’” Id. at 287, with Nichols v. 
Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (“At its essence, the 
systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that Sanchez did not 
act as a man should act. Sanchez was attacked for walking and carrying his 
tray "like a woman" -- i.e., for having feminine mannerisms.  Sanchez was 
derided for not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his 
friend.  Sanchez's male co-workers and one of his supervisors repeatedly 
reminded Sanchez that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, 
referring to him as "she" and "her."  And, the most vulgar name-calling 
directed at Sanchez was cast in female terms.  We conclude that this verbal 
abuse was closely linked to gender.”), and Reed v. S. Bend Nights, Inc., 128 
F. Supp. 3d 996, 998 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (illustrating that certain facts such 
as that plaintiff’s employer thought “being gay was disgusting” and that she 
did not “feel comfortable with [plaintiff’s] sexuality” support non-actionable 
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talks, walks, and dresses as indicative of non-conforming 
behavior.73  On the other hand, if a claim only states that 
discrimination occurred because of the individual’s sexual 
orientation, then it is a sexual orientation case and not actionable.74  
Some courts even refuse to look at gender non-conformity cases 
when sexual orientation is a factor because they do not want to try 
and distinguish the two claims.75 Despite some courts recognizing 
                                                                                                         
sexual orientation claim, while facts like “she acted too manly,” “dressed 
more like a male than a female,” and had a “little more mannish” demeanor 
support gender non-conformity claim).      
73 See supra note 23 for description of gay characteristics.  See also supra 
note 72 for facts highlighting gay characteristics.    
74 Compare Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff can only demonstrate same-sex sexual 
harassment by showing that harassers were motivated by sexual desire, did 
not approve of men in the workplace/job, or harassed because of plaintiff’s 
failure to conform to sex stereotypes).  Plaintiff’s claim only alleged facts 
that he was discriminated because of his sexual orientation and, thus, the 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant.  Id. at 265, and Hamm 
v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058, 1065 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor because “even when 
construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Hamm's favor 
and considering Hamm's coworkers' conduct relating to his job performance 
in conjunction with their comments regarding his sexual orientation in order 
to form the fullest picture, Hamm has failed to make a sufficient showing 
that he was harassed because of his sex.”), with Hamner v. St. Vincent 
Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming 
magistrate judge’s grant of defendants motion for judgment as a matter of 
law because plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim was about his sexual 
orientation).  The harasser lisped at plaintiff, flipped his wrists, and made 
gay jokes.  Id., and Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 
1997) (finding that gay slurs were inadequate to sustain a gender non-
conformity claim where plaintiff did not provide evidence that he failed to 
conform to stereotypes).  
75 See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(dismissing gender non-conformity claim because it recognized that this 
would open door to sexual orientation claims because “[i]n all likelihood, 
any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a 
sex stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals, 
by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual 
practices.”); cf. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000)  
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claims under gender non-conformity, all of the other circuits have 
held that sexual orientation claims do not fall under Title VII.76  
This difference between the circuit courts’ Title VII approaches 
and the Supreme Court’s approach to sexual orientation adds to the 
confusing legal landscape where “a person can be married on 




                                                                                                         
(holding that plaintiff cannot bring successful gender non-conformity claim 
because “Simonton does not offer direct comparative evidence about how 
the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in [his] mixed-sex 
workplace, and does not allege a basis for inferring gender-based animus, 
we are unable to infer that the alleged conduct would not have been directed 
at a woman.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
76 See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that it is settled law that Title VII does not protect 
sexual orientation discrimination); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 
211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a plaintiff cannot bring sexual 
orientation discrimination claim under Title VII); Prowel v. Wise Bus. 
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (stating that the plaintiff’s claim was a 
repackaging of sexual orientation claim which is not allowed under Title 
VII); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(couching holding in terms of same-sex harassment not sexual orientation 
discrimination); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(stating that employment discharge because employee is gay is not 
prohibited under Title VII); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 
471 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that harassment based on sexual orientation is 
not cognizable claim); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 
69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
against gay persons); De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 
329 (9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that Title VII should not be extended to 
include sexual preference); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 
1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that Title VII’s protections do not extend to 
cover sexual orientation); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 
1510 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that discrimination because of sexual 
orientation is not actionable); see also Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 
1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming sexual orientation discrimination 
case dismissal because of the court’s binding precedent).  
77 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016), 
rev’d and remanded, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).   
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E. Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning Before Hively 
 
Before Hively, the Seventh Circuit held that Title VII did 
not provide a remedy for sexual orientation discrimination.78  
However, the Seventh Circuit did recognize the possibility for a 
gay person to bring a gender non-conformity claim.79  Regardless, 
the court did not allow gay persons to “bootstrap” their sexual 
orientation discrimination claims into sex discrimination claims.80  
Thus, the court held to the “traditional” concept of sex 
discrimination.81  
                                                
78 See Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062 (holding that a gay plaintiff failed to show 
harassment based on sex and that coworkers’ actions were based on the 
plaintiff’s work performance and sexual orientation); see, e.g., Hamner, 224 
F.3d at 707 (holding that a gay plaintiff did not have a claim because 
harassment was based on sexual orientation); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 
231 F.3d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that a gay plaintiff did not 
have sex discrimination case because employer did not treat him differently 
than female employees).   
79 See Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (recognizing that because of Price 
Waterhouse, individuals can bring evidence of stereotyping and harassment 
but that this evidence must prove sex discrimination); cf. Doe v. City of 
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), (holding that a gay plaintiff had a 
Title VII claim because “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his 
physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he 
exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworker’s idea of 
how men are supposed to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his 
sex.”) cert. granted and vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).     
80 For factual situations that failed to satisfy gender non-conformity claim, 
see supra note 78. 
81 See supra note 78 for Seventh Circuit cases holding to Ulane reasoning; 
see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(asserting that sex means "biological male or biological female" and that any 
other definition would have to come from Congress).  Thus, the court 
determined that Congress intended “sex” to be understood as the “traditional 
concept of sex.”  Id. at 1085.  For an argument that Hively itself still 
conforms to the “traditional” concept, see generally Brian Soucek, Hively’s 
Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J.F. 115 (2017) (arguing that all of 
Hively opinions focused on form, remaining blind to sex discrimination 
substance).  
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F. The EEOC’s Response to Courts’ Conflicting Views 
 
A month after Obergefell v. Hodges, where the Supreme 
Court held that the right to marry is a fundamental right, and, thus, 
same-sex couples could not be deprived of that right, the EEOC 
decided Baldwin v. Foxx, where a federal employee argued that his 
employer discriminated against him because he is gay.82  The 
EEOC recognized the contradictory outcomes in the courts and 
decided that the distinction between sexual orientation 
discrimination and sex discrimination does not exist.83  The EEOC 
determined that there are at least three ways that sexual orientation 
discrimination falls under sex discrimination: the comparative 
method, associational discrimination, and sex stereotypes.84  
Under the comparative method, an employer discriminates 
when the treatment of the employee would not have occurred but 
for the employee’s sex.85  Under associational discrimination,86 an 
                                                
82 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); See Baldwin v. Foxx, 
2015 EEOPUB LEXIS 1905, *3 (E.E.O.C. July 16, 2015) (alleging that the 
complainant was not selected for position because he is gay); see also 
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2604–05 (holding that same-sex couples may 
exercise the right to marry).  See generally Rebecca Hanner White, The 
EEOC, The Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing 
the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 
51 (1995) (illustrating EEOC’s struggle with interpretive authority because 
Title VII did not provide the EEOC with explicit interpretive authority). 
83 See Baldwin at *13 (holding that “sexual orientation is inherently a sex-
based consideration.”).  While the EEOC has held this, the Department of 
Justice, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017), 
currently holds the opposing viewpoint.  See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 
2017) (No. 15-3775), 2017 U.S. 2d Cir. Briefs LEXIS 5 (asserting that it is a 
settled matter of law that Title VII does not include sexual orientation 
discrimination). 
84 See Baldwin at *27 (summarizing that an individual can bring sexual 
orientation claim under three approaches).  
85 See id. at *13 (asserting that when acting based on an individual's sexual 
orientation, the employer necessarily takes into account an individual's sex 
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employer discriminates when the treatment is based on the sex of 
the person with whom the employee associates romantically.87  
Under sex stereotyping, an employer discriminates when the 
treatment is based on gender assumptions, with sexual orientation 
being one of those assumptions.88  Thus, the EEOC held that 
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily sex discrimination 
                                                                                                         
and gives example of comparing lesbian employee having photo of spouse 
on desk with male employee displaying female spouse photo).  
86  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the state 
prohibiting interracial marriage violated the principle of equality under 14th 
Amendment because it “requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be 
restricted by invidious racial discriminations”).  The Supreme Court rejected 
the idea that the miscegenation laws were not discriminatory because they 
punish equally both the white and the African American participants in an 
interracial marriage.  See id. at 10 (determining that equal application of the 
statute is not enough to support keeping miscegenation laws because the 
purpose of Fourteenth Amendment is to “eliminate all official state sources 
of invidious racial discrimination in the States”).  Other circuits have also 
extended Loving to Title VII cases.  Compare Parr v. Woodmen of World 
Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that a white man 
married to a black woman who was denied employment had a claim under 
Title VII because “[i]t would be folly for this court to hold that a plaintiff 
cannot state a claim under Title VII for discrimination based on an 
interracial marriage because, had the plaintiff been a member of the spouse's 
race, the plaintiff would still not have been hired.”), and Holcomb v. Iona 
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (determining that a white employee 
married to a black individual who was fired had claim under Title VII 
because “an employer may violate Title VII if it takes action against an 
employee because of the employee’s association with a person of another 
race.”), with Drake v. Minn, Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant conceded that an “employee can bring 
associational discrimination claim under Title VII”).      
87 See Baldwin v. Foxx, 2015 EEOPUB LEXIS 1905, *17 (E.E.O.C. July 
16, 2015) (taking someone's sex into account and treating them differently 
because the employee associates with someone of same sex).  
88 See id. at *13 (stating that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is premised on sex-based assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, 
or norms”); see also id. at 22 (quoting Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 
403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (asserting that sexual orientation discrimination is 
“often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually 
defined gender norms.”)).   
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because sexual orientation is inherently a sex-based consideration 
and that gay/lesbian sexual orientation is the ultimate failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes.89  
 
III. THROUGH ROSE-COLORED GLASSES: HOW THE VARIOUS 
OPINIONS IN HIVELY APPROACHED THE INTERPRETATIVE TASK 
In 2000, Kimberly Hively started teaching as a part-time, 
adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College in South Bend, 
Indiana.90  Between 2009 and 2014, she applied to at least six full-
time positions at the college, but failed to receive any of them.91  
In July 2014, the college did not renew her part-time contract.92  
On December 13, 2013, Hively filed a pro se charge with the 
EEOC, arguing that Ivy Tech refused to hire her for the full-time 
positions or to renew her contract because of her status as an 
openly lesbian woman.93  
After exhausting the procedural requirements available to 
her through the EEOC, she filed a complaint in the District Court 
for the Northern District of Indiana.94  At the district court level, 
                                                
89 See Baldwin, at *13 (holding that “[i]ndeed, we conclude that sexual 
orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allegation of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex 
discrimination under Title VII.”). 
90 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 
2017) (stating Hively’s occupation and time at Ivy Tech Community 
College).   
91 See id. (describing Hively’s attempts to procure full-time position).   
92 See id. (stating that “in July 2014, her part-time contract was not 
renewed.”). 
93 See id. (depicting how Hively filed with EEOC).  Her pro se charge only 
stated that she had been discriminated against because of her sexual 
orientation.  See id. (citing pro se charge which stated that “I have applied 
for several positions at IVY TECH, fulltime, in the last 5 years.  I believe I 
am being blocked from fulltime employment without just cause.  I believe I 
am being discriminated against based on my sexual orientation.  I believe I 
have been discriminated against and that my rights under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were violated.”).   
94 See id. (recounting that Hively received a right-to-sue letter from EEOC, 
which allowed her to sue in federal court).  Her complaint provided more 
facts on which she based her claim.  See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of 
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Ivy Tech filed a 12(b)(6) motion, arguing that sexual orientation is 
not a protected class under Title VII.95  The court granted the 
motion and dismissed the case with prejudice.96  Hively appealed, 
and, although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, the 
court provided an in-depth analysis of circuit precedent and the 
EEOC’s opinion in Baldwin.97  After Hively filed a brief 
requesting a rehearing en banc, a majority of judges in regular 
active service voted to rehear the case en banc because of this 
issue’s importance and to bring the law into conformity with the 
Supreme Court’s guidance.98   
                                                                                                         
Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 699 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that the complaint alleged 
that “although she had the necessary qualifications for full-time employment 
and had never received a negative evaluation, the college refused to even to 
interview her for any of the six full-time positions for which she applied 
between 2009 and 2014 . . .”), rev’d and remanded, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 
2017).   
95 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (recounting the defendant’s argument that 
“sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII” and the district 
court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro. 12(b)(6)); see generally FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6) (“failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted”).  In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 
court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, i.e., Hively.  See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (noting that the court must 
look at the facts in the light most favorable to Hively).   
96 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341 (noting that “relying on a line of this court’s 
cases exemplified by Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., 
Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000), the district court granted Ivy Tech’s 
motion and dismissed Hively’s case with prejudice.”). 
97 See id. (affirming the district court’s decision); see also Hively, 830 F.3d 
at 709 (holding that while distinguishing between a sex stereotyping claim 
and a sexual orientation claim is difficult and can lead to contradictory 
results, the distinction is not impossible).  The panel did consider the 
EEOC’s position but was unwilling to overturn precedent.  See id. at 702–
703 (discussing the EEOC’s arguments in Baldwin).  Moreover, the panel 
believed that only the Supreme Court or new legislation could make sexual 
orientation a class under Title VII.  See id. at 718 (determining that the 
Supreme Court or Congress were the only available avenues of change).    
98 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (noting the importance of the issue and 
recognizing the power of the full court of appeals to overrule earlier 
decisions); see also Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of 
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
reversed the district court’s decision and remanded it for further 
proceedings, holding that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is discrimination based on sex as stated in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.99  The four opinions in Hively each 
focused on determining a particular framework for statutory 
interpretation and then utilized that framework to determine what 
sex discrimination means.100  Interestingly, each opinion utilizes a 
different interpretative approach that leads to a different response 
to what sex discrimination means.101  The majority focused on the 
EEOC’s arguments and the Supreme Court’s approach to sexual 
orientation in the legal landscape.102  Judge Posner, in his 
concurrence, posited a somewhat radical interpretive approach, 
wherein the court has the power to update old statutes so as to 
render them applicable to today’s legal issues.103  Judge Flaum 
provides a logically clear and simple approach: one cannot think 
                                                                                                         
Plaintiff at 1, Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 
2017) (No. 15-1720) (requesting rehearing en banc).     
99 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 351–52 (overruling the previous line of Seventh 
Circuit cases and holding that it is impossible to discriminate based on 
sexual orientation without discriminating based on sex); see also id. at 345 
(stating that under 12(b)(6) motion, the court reviews facts in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party).    
100 For discussion of each opinions’ interpretative method and its 
application, see infra notes 106–181. 
101 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (asserting that the court is not amending 
statute but rather determining what discrimination based on sex means, 
which is a question of statutory interpretation).  Compare id. at 343–44 
(determining that when a statute is not plain on its face, the judiciary must 
look to broader context and recognize that “statutory prohibitions often go 
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils”); with id. at 
352 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that there are three types of 
interpretation and he uses judicial interpretive updating); and id. at 360 
(Sykes, J., dissenting) (asserting that the judicial role is to interpret 
“statutory language as a reasonable person would have understood it at the 
time of enactment.”).  
102 For further discussion of the majority’s argument, see infra notes 106–
141 and accompanying text.  
103 For further discussion of Judge Posner’s concurring opinion, see infra 
notes 142–158 and accompanying text.   
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about sexual orientation without taking the individual’s sex into 
account.104  Finally, the dissent focused on precedent and the idea 
that sex and sexual orientation are distinct categories.105  
 
A. Following in the EEOC’s Footsteps: Majority Finds 
Sexual Orientation in Sex Discrimination 
The majority found that sexual orientation is a type of sex 
discrimination.106  It viewed itself as having the authority and 
responsibility of bringing the Seventh Circuit in line with the 
Supreme Court’s guidance on sexual orientation.107  The majority 
opinion, written by Chief Judge Wood, began its analysis by 
noting that the court was not amending the statute but was rather 
only interpreting what it means to discriminate because of a 
person’s sex.108  For the majority, statutory interpretation begins 
with deciding whether the statute is plain on its face; if so, there is 
no need to look at secondary sources.109  If not, one can look to the 
broader context of the statute, particularly the context at the time 
                                                
104 For further discussion of Judge Flaum’s concurring opinion, see infra 
notes 159–166 and accompanying text.     
105 For further discussion of Judge Sykes’s dissenting opinion, see infra 
notes 167–181 and accompanying text.   
106 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 351 (asserting the “common-sense reality that it 
is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation 
without discriminating on the basis of sex, persuade us that the time has 
come to overrule our previous cases that have endeavored to find and 
observe that line.”).    
107 See id. at 343 (noting that “[i]n light of the importance of the issue, and 
recognizing the power of the full court to overrule earlier decisions and to 
bring our law into conformity with the Supreme Court’s guidance, a 
majority of the judges in regular actives service voted to rehear this case en 
banc.”).  
108 See id. (asserting that the court was not amending Title VII, but was only 
interpreting the statute and the meaning of word “sex”).  
109 See id. (arguing that “[f]ew people would insist that there is a need to 
delve into secondary sources if the statute is plain on its face.”).  
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of enactment.110  However, for the majority, the context is only 
uncontroversial when its meaning is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom at the time about the law’s reach.111  The 
majority determined that interpretation becomes much more 
difficult when the statutory language includes multiple 
interpretations and unintended consequences.112  Thus, according 
to the majority, while legislative history can highlight that 
Congress has rejected certain interpretations, it is notoriously 
unreliable.113  
Instead of focusing on legislative intent and the statute’s 
meaning at the time of enactment, the majority relied on the 
logical reasoning in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 
where the Court argued that statutes cover not only what Congress 
intended but also “reasonably comparable evils.”114  Thus, the 
Hively majority followed this interpretative approach, reasoning 
that “the fact that enacting Congress may not have anticipated a 
particular application of the law cannot stand in the way of 
provisions of the law that are not on the books.”115  In fact, the 
                                                
110 See id. (determining that “[e]ven if it is not pellucid, the best source for 
disambiguation is the broader context of the statute that the legislature – in 
this case, Congress – passed.”)    
111 See id. (concluding that interpreting statute is easy when its meaning 
conforms to context at time of enactment).  
112 See id. (arguing that interpreting statute becomes much harder when it 
extends to situations outside the context at time of enactment). 
113 See id. (noting that “[l]egislative history is notoriously malleable.  Even 
worse is the temptation to try to divine the significance of unsuccessful 
legislative efforts to change the law.); see also id. (highlighting that 
Congress could have decided to not include sexual orientation for various 
other reasons). 
114 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see Hively, 
853 F.3d at 344 (explaining that “[o]ur interpretive task is guided instead by 
the Supreme Court’s approach in the closely related case of Oncale . . .”); 
see also id. (quoting Oncale, which states that “statutory prohibitions often 
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparably evils, and it is 
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principle concerns of 
our legislators by which we are governed.”).  For further discussion of 
Oncale, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.   
115 Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (asserting that the meaning of “sex” goes beyond 
what Congress intended and towards full scope of word).  
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majority noted the Supreme Court had already expanded Title VII 
to cover discriminatory situations such as sexual harassment, 
actuarial assumptions about a person’s lifespan, and gender non-
conformity.116  
The majority also looked to Supreme Court decisions that 
deal more generally with sexual orientation discrimination in order 
to understand the current legal landscape of sexual orientation 
issues.117  The majority found that the Supreme Court, in recent 
years, has consistently protected individuals discriminated against 
because of their sexual orientation.118  From these cases, the 
majority opined that there is a growing trend towards protecting 
gay persons and recognized that, in doing so, society can provide 
greater equality.119    
The majority then analyzed plaintiff Hively’s two proposed 
approaches to including sexual orientation discrimination under 
sex discrimination: the comparative method and associational 
                                                
116 See id. (listing Supreme Court cases that have expanded the types of 
claims under Title VII).  For further discussion of these cases, see supra 
note 58.  
117 See id. at 349 (asserting that “[t]oday’s decision must be understood 
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field 
of employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.”).  See generally id. at 349–50 (detailing 
other sexual orientation Supreme Court cases in Part III of opinion).  
118 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (holding that the Texas criminal statute violated the liberty of 
the Due Process Clause because it criminalized homosexual intimacy); with 
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013) (finding that the 
portion of Defense of Marriage Act that excluded same-sex partners from 
the  “spouse” definition violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (holding 
that the 14th Amendment protected the right to marry as a fundamental 
liberty right).   
119 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 350–51 (quoting Obergefell to emphasize the 
Court’s commitment to sexual orientation equality); see Obergefell, 135 
S.Ct. at 2604 (“[i]t is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty 
of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge 
central precepts of equality.”).   
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discrimination.120  The majority agreed with these approaches and 
found them to be valid examples of how sexual orientation 
discrimination can fall under Title VII.121  In addition, the court 
evaluated the comparative method with the sex stereotyping 
reasoning in Price Waterhouse and determined that sexual 
orientation claims can also be brought as sex stereotyping 
claims.122  
 
i. The Comparative Method 
Under the comparative method, the only variable that 
changes in the scenario is the person’s sex to determine if this 
change creates a change in the employer’s actions.123  Thus, the 
majority asked whether the college would have treated Hively 
differently if she was a man, but everything else stayed the same, 
notably her partner’s sex.124  If so, then the employer was 
discriminating based on sex.125  In Hively’s case, the court 
compared Hively as a lesbian with Hively as a heterosexual man 
and determined that she would not have been fired if she were a 
                                                
120 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (noting that “Hively offers two approaches in 
support of her contention that “sex discrimination” includes discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.”).  
121 See id. at 344 (arguing for two approaches); see also id. at 345 
(concluding that, under the comparative method, the defendant is 
discriminating against Hively because she is a woman); see also id. at 349 
(illustrating that the associational discrimination theory also works).  
122 Id. at 346 (determining that there is no line between gender non-
conformity claims and sexual orientation claims).   
123 See id. at 345 (stating that the comparative method is where the court 
“attempt[s] to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s 
decision: has she described a situation in which, holding all other things 
constant and changing only her sex, she would have been treated the same 
way?”).  
124 See id. (noting that the hypothetical would make Hively a male 
heterosexual).   
125 See id. (stating that “Ivy Tech is disadvantaging her because she is a 
woman.”).  The majority blends together the gender non-conformity issue 
with the comparative method.  See also id. at 346 (stating that “Hively 
represents the ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype”).    
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man.126  Thus, the majority concluded that “Ivy Tech is 
disadvantaging her because she is a woman.”127     
 
ii. Gender Non-Conformity 
While the majority started with the comparative method, it 
ended up moving from the comparative method to a more nuanced 
method that focused on gender non-conformity.128  According to 
the majority, there is no difference between a gender non-
conformity and a sexual orientation claim.129  The court noted that 
attempting to draw a line between the two types of claims has 
created contradictory and somewhat absurd results in both the 
district and circuit courts.130  A lesbian (and gay persons in 
general) represented the “ultimate case of failure to conform to the 
female stereotype.”131  In both the situation where a woman was 
discriminated against for being too assertive and one where she 
was discriminated against for being a lesbian, the employer’s 
behavior necessarily had to take the victim’s biological sex into 
account.132  The majority reasoned that being heterosexual is just 
                                                
126 See id. at 345–46 (using the comparative method to determine if sex 
discrimination occurred).  
127 Id. at 345 (emphasis omitted).  
128 See id. at 346 (deciding that there is no distinction between a gender non-
conformity claim and a sexual orientation claim); see, e.g., id. (arguing that, 
in gender non-conformity cases, employers were deciding what 
behaviors/characteristics were acceptable in the job and that sexual 
orientation is one such characteristic).  
129 See supra note 128 for information on majority’s response to gender 
non-conformity.  For further discussion of gender non-conformity and 
sexual orientation, see infra notes 131–135 and accompanying text.    
130 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 350 (noting that to remove sex from sexual 
orientation creates contradictory results); see supra notes 68–77 and 
accompanying text for a discussion on the differing district court 
approaches.  
131 Id. at 346 (stating that “Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to 
conform to the female stereotype”).    
132 See id. (stating that sexual orientation discrimination is based on 
assumptions about the correct behavior for someone of particular sex); see 
also id. at 347 (“The discriminatory behavior does not exist without taking 
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one of the many sex stereotypes, i.e., where an employer assumes 
that the acceptable behavior of a woman is that she be attracted to 
men.133  Even before Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court and 
the Seventh Circuit had allowed claims where women were 
discriminated at work for resisting stereotypical roles.134  Thus, the 
court concluded that sexual orientation is the ultimate failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes since the proper behavior is for Hively, 
as a woman, to be sexually attracted to men.135  
 
iii. Associational Discrimination 
The majority found that the associational discrimination 
approach to sex discrimination also protected against sexual 
orientation discrimination.136  Under an associational 
discrimination approach, the issue is whether the discrimination 
would occur if Hively’s partner’s sex was changed.137  This 
                                                                                                         
the victim’s biological sex . . . into account.  Any discomfort, disapproval, 
or job decision based on the fact that the complainant – woman or man – 
dresses differently, speaks differently, or dates or marries a same-sex 
partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex.”).   
133 See id. at 346 (noting that, in the United States, heterosexuality is norm 
and, thus, any other sexuality is not normal).   
134 See id. (highlighting two circuit court cases where female stereotypical 
roles were at issue).  Compare Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 
543, 544 (1971) (holding that an employer cannot refuse to hire women with 
pre-school age children who hires men with pre-school age children), with 
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(striking down the employment regulation that required airline stewardesses 
to be unmarried).  
135 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (stating that sexual orientation discrimination 
is founded on behavioral assumptions of what is “proper” for someone of 
particular sex).     
136 See id. at 349 (holding that associational discrimination applies to sex 
discrimination cases and applies in this case).  
137 See id. at 347 (stating that “[i]t is now accepted that a person who is 
discriminated against because of the protected characteristic of one with 
whom she associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her own 
traits.”); see also id. at 349 (noting that “if we were to change the sex of one 
partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be different.  This 
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approach comes from Loving and its line of cases where interracial 
couples were discriminated against.138  While in those cases the 
claim was constitutional in nature, the majority argued that 
associational discrimination is also applicable under Title VII.139  
The majority then asserted that, since one can bring a race 
associational discrimination claim, then one can bring a sex 
associational discrimination claim because Title VII does not 
distinguish between the different discriminatory categories; thus, 
an argument made in race discrimination cases can be applied in 
sex discrimination cases.140  Therefore, the majority held that 
sexual orientation discrimination can be considered a sex 
associational discrimination claim because “[i]f we were to change 
the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would 
be different” which “reveals that the discrimination rests on 
distinctions drawn according to sex.”141    
 
B. Get with the Times: Judge Posner’s Concurring Opinion 
Arguing for Judiciary to Update Statutes 
According to Judge Posner in his concurring opinion, 
judges should reevaluate the meaning of statutes like Title VII so 
                                                                                                         
reveals that the discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according to 
sex.”).   
138 See id. at 347 (highlighting the line of cases that extended discrimination 
protection to both partners).  For further discussion of Loving, see supra 
note 86.  
139 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 347–48 (citing to circuits that have extended race 
associational discrimination to Title VII cases). For further discussion of 
cases that extended associational discrimination to Title VII, see supra note 
86.  
140 See Hively,  853 F.3d at 349 (noting that Title VII does not draw 
distinction between different types of discrimination, and, therefore, the 
courts can use race arguments in sex context); see also Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244, n.9 (1989) (plurality opinion) (determining that 
Title VII treats each of the categories exactly the same); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d 
at 349 (asserting that “[i]f we were to change the sex of one partner in a 
lesbian relationship, the outcome would be different.  This reveals that the 
discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according to sex.”).  
141 Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.  
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that the statutes remain relevant.142  Judge Posner argued that there 
are three ways to interpret statutes.143  The last of these options is 
“judicial interpretive updating,” which he defined as, when the 
judiciary gives new meaning to a statute so that the statute has 
modern significance.144  
For Judge Posner, judicial interpretive updating only 
comes into play when a lengthy amount of time has passed since 
the statute’s enactment.145  Judge Posner highlighted various other 
situations where “[s]tatutes and constitutional provisions 
frequently are interpreted on the basis of present need and present 
understanding rather than the original meaning.”146  Judge Posner 
drew on the interpretative method in Missouri v. Holland, where 
Justice Holmes stated that “[w]e must consider what this country 
has become in deciding what that amendment has reserved.”147  
                                                
142 See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the failure to 
adopt judicial updating would render Title VII anachronistic).    
143 See id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring) (indicating that there are three 
approaches to statutory interpretation: the original meaning of the statute as 
understood by legislators, unexpressed intent, and the new meaning that 
applies to today’s situations).  The first is the meaning intended by the 
legislators in connection with how the word is interpreted in everyday 
language. See id. (describing this approach as the most conventional and 
easy to determine).  The second is interpretation by unexpressed intent 
where, for example, an ordinance states “no vehicles in the park” but it is 
understood that this does not apply to an ambulance. See id. (quoting 
William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59–60 
(1765) where Blackstone argued that “where words bear either none, or a 
very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate 
from the received sense of them.”).     
144 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J., concurring) (alleging that Title 
VII “invites an interpretation that will update it to the present, a present that 
differs markedly from the era in which the Act was enacted.”).   
145 See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasizing that this approach 
“presupposes a lengthy interval between enactment and (re)interpretation.”).  
146 Id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).   
147 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920) (arguing that 
“[t]he case before us must be considered in the light of our whole 
experience and note merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago . . . 
.  We must consider what this country has become in deciding what the 
amendment has reserved.”).  
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In Judge Posner’s opinion, society’s understanding of sex 
has changed dramatically.148  As he stated, “today ‘sex’ has a 
broader meaning than the genitalia you’re born with.”149  He then 
discussed how society’s understanding of sexual orientation has 
changed, noting that, today, we understand that homosexuality150 
is “biological and innate, not a choice.”151  Thus, being 
discriminated against for being a lesbian and being discriminated 
against for being a woman are analogous situations because there 
is no choice.152  For Judge Posner, there was no difference 
between the two situations because “homosexuality is nothing 
worse than failing to fulfill stereotypical gender roles.”153  Judge 
Posner admitted that this is a loose interpretation of “sex” but 
views this as justifiable because of the social policy to protect gay 
persons.154  Thus, today’s use of the word “sex” connotes both 
gender and sexual orientation.155 According to Judge Posner, this 
can be viewed as the natural progression of ideas from sexual 
harassment to gender non-conformity to sexual orientation.156 He 
                                                
148 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 354 (Posner, J., concurring) (providing a brief 
history of how society’s understanding of sex has changed, notably how sex 
no longer is just about the biological genitalia with which one is born).  
149 Id. (Posner, J., concurring). 
150 I utilize the term “homosexuality” here because Judge Posner used it 
within his opinion.  See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (utilizing the term 
“homosexuality” to describe lesbian and gay male sexual orientation).  
151 Id. at 354 (Posner, J., concurring); see also id. (Posner, J., concurring) 
(noting the developments in the scientific understanding of sexual 
orientation).  
152 See id. at 355–56 (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that the type of 
discrimination is analogous).  
153 Id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring).   
154 See id. (Posner, J., concurring) (declaring that the broader interpretation 
of “sex” is necessary because gay persons need to be protected since they 
are now considered to be “normal in the ways that count”).   
155 See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (concluding this to be true).  
156 See id. at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (depicting how it took time for 
society to appreciate that sexual harassment was form of sex discrimination, 
it has taken even longer to view gender non-conformity as sex 
discrimination, and has taken still longer to realize that sexual orientation is 
sex discrimination).  
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was, however, reluctant to rely on the majority’s use of Oncale 
and Loving, arguing that Oncale was still too limiting to allow 
sexual orientation discrimination, and Loving was inapposite 
because it concerned race and constitutional issues.157  He 
concluded by highlighting that the judiciary frequently performs 
judicial interpretative updating so as to lessen the burden on the 
legislative branch to update statutes, and that it is the judiciary’s 
role to utilize the social changes, since Title VII’s enactment, in 
order to update the statute to modern times.158    
 
C. “SEX”ual Orientation: Judge Flaum’s Concurrence 
Argues Sexual Orientation Necessarily Involves Thinking 
About Person’s Sex 
 Judge Flaum agreed with the majority’s discussion of the 
comparative method, gender non-conformity, and associational 
discrimination.159  However, he approached interpreting “sex” in a 
different manner.160  He argued that “discrimination against an 
employee on the basis of their homosexuality is necessarily, in 
part, discrimination based on their sex” because homosexuality is 
the sexual attraction to persons of the same sex.161  Thus, one has 
                                                
157 See id. at 355–56 (Posner, J., concurring) (commenting that Oncale does 
not really help to expand the interpretive framework and Loving is a 
constitutional case on race).  
158 See id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) (asserting that the courts can 
update statutes so that the entire burden in not placed on Congress, and 
recognizing that judges understand the meaning of “sex” differently today 
because they live in a different time with a different culture).   
159 See id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (joining Parts I and II of the majority 
opinion).   
160 See generally id. at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (arguing that sex is 
fundamental to thinking about sexual orientation).  
161 See id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (citing to various dictionary definitions of 
“homosexual” including Homosexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/homosexual; 
Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); and Homosexual, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1964)).  Homosexual is also defined 
as “of, relating to, or characterized by sexual desire for a person of the same 
 
KRALL: ONE TEXT, ANOTHER RENDERING NOW: IN THE WAKE OF HIVELY V. IVY TECH CMTY. COLL. OF 
IND., THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE TO DEFINE SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW [Vol. VII: II 
 
60 
to take into account an individual’s sex in order to understand the 
individual’s sexual orientation.162  Judge Flaum separated the 
discriminatory action into discrimination because of “(A) the 
employee’s sex, and (B) their sexual attraction to individuals of 
the same sex.”163 
 According to Judge Flaum, since sex is evidentially a 
factor, the issue is whether Title VII requires the discrimination to 
occur solely because of sex.164  The statute itself states that the 
enumerated trait only has to be a “motivating factor for an 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”165  Therefore, all that Hively must show to bring a Title 
VII claim is that the discrimination occurred because she is a 
woman who is sexually attracted to women.166        
 
                                                                                                         
sex.  Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis 
added).     
162 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (asserting that “[o]ne 
cannot consider a person’s homosexuality without also accounting for their 
sex: doing so would render ‘same’ and ‘own’ meaningless.”).  
163 Id. (Flaum, J., concurring).  
164 See id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (raising the question “[d]oes Title VII’s 
text require a plaintiff to show that an employer discriminated against them 
solely ‘because of’ an enumerated trait?”).  
165 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2017) 
(stating that there is an unlawful employment practice when sex is “a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice”); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989) (determining that ‘because of’ does not mean 
‘solely because of,’ and, thus, there can be mixture of legitimate and 
illegitimate reasons for employment practice).     
166 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring) (holding that this is 
all the employee must show to bring a claim).   
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D. I Know Sex When I See It: Judge Sykes’s Categorical 
Approach to Sex and Sexual Orientation 
 Like the majority, the dissent viewed the issue as one of 
statutory interpretation.167  However, Judge Sykes believed the 
appropriate interpretive mode was to ask how a “reasonable person 
would have understood it when it was adopted.”168  Therefore, the 
judiciary could not instill new meaning into the statute or update it 
to current conditions.169  In addition, precluding sexual orientation 
from sex discrimination has been broadly accepted in the federal 
courts for many years.170  Moreover, Congress has refused to 
include sexual orientation in Title VII, while adding it into other 
statutes.171  While there is debate in the public sphere, Judge Sykes 
believed that this debate has no place in statutory interpretation, 
which is an objective inquiry.172  
Using the comparative method, the dissent argued that the 
correct comparator is a gay male not a heterosexual one.173  Under 
                                                
167 See id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (noting the “question before the en 
banc court is one of statutory interpretation.”).   
168 Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting); see also id. at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the original public meaning decides statutory meaning and 
asks the rhetorical question of “[i]s it even remotely plausible that in 1964, 
when Title VII was adopted, a reasonable persons competent in the English 
language would have understood that a law banning employment 
discrimination ‘because of sex’ also banned discrimination because of 
sexual orientation?  The answer is no, of course not.”).  She adopted this 
position in large part because of the Constitution’s requirement of 
bicameralism and presentment.  See id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing that statutory modification by the judiciary circumvents 
bicameralism and presentment, and claiming that this is why the textualist 
approach is best). 
169 Id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting).  
170 Id. at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting).   
171 See id. at 363–64 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (highlighting other statutes that 
do mention sexual orientation discrimination so as to argue that Congress 
did not intend to protect sexual orientation in Title VII).  
172 See id. at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (remarking that society’s 
understanding of gay rights has changed dramatically since Title VII was 
adopted).  
173 Id. at 366–67 (Sykes, J., dissenting).  
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the majority’s comparator, both sex and sexual orientation change, 
not just the sex variable; thus, in Hively’s scenario, she not only 
becomes a man but also a heterosexual.174  For Judge Sykes, 
sexual orientation and sex are two distinct categories that are 
unrelated to each other.175   
Under the associational discrimination approach, the 
dissent argued that the miscegenation laws’ purpose was to 
support white supremacy.176  Since sexual orientation 
discrimination does not aim to maintain the superiority of one sex, 
the discrimination is not inherently sexist.177  Thus, the Loving line 
of cases does not support merging sex and sexual orientation.178    
For the gender non-conformity approach, Judge Sykes 
asserted that Price Waterhouse did not create a separate theory to 
prove sex discrimination.179  Rather, sex stereotyping can be 
evidence of sex discrimination, but there must still be proof that 
the employer relied on the employee’s sex.180  For the dissent, 
sexual orientation is not a sex-specific stereotype, and, thus, is 
unrelated to sex stereotyping.181 
                                                
174 Id. at 345.  But cf. id. at 365 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that 
comparative method is a technique for evaluating evidence of plaintiff’s 
allegation, not for evaluating legal questions).  
175 Id. at 363 (Sykes, J., dissenting); see id. at 365 (stating that “[s]exism . . . 
homophobia are separate kinds of prejudice that classify people in distinct 
ways based on different immutable characteristics.”).  
176 See id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing that antimiscegenation laws 
are “premised on invidious ideas about white superiority and use racial 
classifications toward the end of racial purity and white supremacy . . . .  No 
one argues that sexual-orientation discrimination aims to promote or 
perpetuate the supremacy of one sex.”).      
177 Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).  
178 Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting).   
179 Id. at 369 (Sykes, J., dissenting).   
180 See id. (Sykes, J., dissenting) (quoting Price Waterhouse wherein court 
stated that employer had to actually rely on gender when doing employment 
practice).    
181 See id. at 370 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “[s]exual 
orientation discrimination does not classify people according to invidious or 
idiosyncratic male or female stereotypes.  It does not spring from a sex-
specific bias at all.”).   
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IV. OURS IS NOT TO REASON WHY: CRITIQUING HIVELY’S 
ANTI-CLASSIFICATION APPROACH AS PROMOTING RATHER 
THAN PREVENTING SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Instead of encouraging the dynamic interpretation that 
occurred before Gilbert, Hively  clung to the “traditional” concept, 
preventing the much-needed discussion of how to interpret sex 
discrimination in today’s social context from occurring.182  Under 
the anti-classification approach, the courts lost the dynamic 
approach based on social policy and gender stereotypes.183   
Moreover, they forgot how important the struggle to understand 
sex discrimination was to promoting changes in the normative 
roles of men and women.184   
                                                
182 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1366–70 (describing how even though 
Gilbert was overruled by Congress amending Title VII to include pregnancy 
discrimination, the Gilbert test lives on).  
183 See id. at 1316 (asserting that, in Gilbert, “[t]alk of deference to the 
legislature and fidelity to tradition replaced discussion of the need to 
preserve the traditional family and women’s role within it.”); see also 
Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (arguing that Hively decision resulted in “a 
gender-blind approach to equality closer to that of the conservative anti-
classificationists on the Supreme Court than to the Justices who have thus 
far voted for LGBT rights.”).     
184 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1348 (noting that this approach emerged 
during the debate about airline stewardess employment practices); see also 
id. at 1313–14 (summarizing argument that sex discrimination’s meaning 
was uncertain during 60s and 70s and multiple entities voiced various 
opinions on issue).  Compare id. at 1352 (noting that airlines used anti-
classification approach to limit the reach of sex discrimination so that they 
could regulate the age and marital status of stewardesses, but the approach 
was couched in homemaking and childrearing terms not formal logic), with 
id. at 1356 (citing the EEOC’s determination that airline policies were 
discriminatory because they were based on assumptions about married 
women that limited women’s access to the workplace).  But see id. at 1359 
(highlighting that Gilbert rejected analysis based on normative 
considerations and determined that it was bound to traditional concept since 
the court is interpreter not creator of law).  
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By forgetting that history, the Hively opinion attempted to 
fit sexual orientation into the anti-classification form.185  In doing 
so, it created a logically inconsistent reasoning wherein the court 
produced the outcome it wanted, i.e., sexual orientation 
discrimination under sex discrimination, but used the formalist 
framework.186  Thus, Hively is not as groundbreaking as originally 
thought because all of the opinions utilized the same anti-
classification framework that historically prevented sex 
discrimination claims that failed the comparator test from being 
brought, including sexual orientation discrimination claims.187    
                                                
185 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 115 (arguing that Hively opinions “show 
how little judges’ views on statutory interpretation matter when they are 
blind to substance” and noting that the opinions fail to cite to one gender 
theorist, gay rights advocate, etc.); see also Franklin, supra note 2 at 1312 
(determining that the anti-classification approach to sex discrimination, i.e., 
the “traditional concept” of sex discrimination is a legal fiction that does not 
represent the interpretive history of the term). 
186 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 118 (showing that the majority’s 
comparative method fails to satisfy formal logic because it is unclear who 
the comparator should be and a heterosexual male comparator does not 
separate groups by sex).  See generally id. at 115 (depicting how Hively 
opinions used the anti-classification approach, and yet failed to meet its 
logical requirements). For further discussion of how the majority relies on 
but ultimately fails the comparator test, see infra notes 191–203 and 
accompanying text.  See also Soucek, supra note 81, at 118–19 (noting that 
the gender non-conformity argument also fails the formal logic approach 
because both men and women violate heterosexual norms).  For further 
discussion of gender non-conformity issues in Hively, see infra notes 207–
221 and accompanying text.  See also id. at 119 (highlighting that the 
associational discrimination approach is really just a type of comparator 
argument and thus also fails the anti-classification argument).  For further 
discussion of associational discrimination approach in Hively, see infra 
notes 204–206 and accompanying text.   
187 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (concluding that the Hively opinions 
are blind to sex discrimination’s normative principles and that they 
promulgate the anti-classification approach); see also Goldberg, supra note 
37, at 733–39 (noting that the use of comparator test has constricted the idea 
of discrimination and explains three discrimination theories that have not 
gained “jurisprudential traction because the problems they identify cannot, 
in effect, be seen by courts”); cf. Soucek, supra note 22, at 768–70 
(detailing rhetoric of blindness in antidiscrimination law and how only 
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A. Using the Gilbert Hermeneutic Approach: Comparative 
and Associational Discrimination Methods 
 In attempting to conform to the anti-classification 
approach, the Seventh Circuit tried to produce a result that 
promotes our society’s changing views on sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation, while also trying to base that result in formal logic.188  
Couching the decision within the traditionally accepted framework 
of interpretation allowed the court to retain judicial legitimacy 
through the use of formal logic that identifies clear and definable 
categories, while avoiding a result based on complex sociological 
judgments.189  The court’s attempt to force a new result out of an 
old framework creates logical fallacies, as seen with the 
comparator and associational discrimination method.190   
The comparative method is the straight application of the 
“traditional” concept of sex discrimination, i.e., the anti-
classification approach.191  This method attempts to separate 
individuals into mutually exclusive male/female groups.192  The 
                                                                                                         
protecting perceivable gay persons strengthens the conception that gay 
persons are “different”).  
188 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (concluding that, while Hively’s result 
is a success for LGBT rights, its reasoning failed to note important changes 
in scholarship and advocacy that led to court’s decision); see also infra 
notes 191–206 and accompanying text for discussion of Hively’s use of anti-
classification approach.  
189 Goldberg, supra note 37, at 740.  
190 See infra notes 191–206 and accompanying text for argument that Hively 
approaches create logically inconsistent results.   
191 Compare Franklin, supra note 2, at 1311 (arguing that, under the 
traditional concept of sex discrimination, “[c]ourts hold that only by 
demonstrating that such comparators were not subject to the same adverse 
treatment can plaintiffs prove it was their biological sex that triggered the 
alleged discrimination.”), with Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1479 
(highlighting that the traditional statutory interpretative approach focuses on 
Congressional intent at time of enactment and that “[p]revailing approaches 
to statutory interpretation treat statutes as static texts.”).       
192 See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
majority’s comparative method.  Compare Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. 
of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) (depicting the comparative 
method as holding all other variables equal except sex), with Franklin, supra 
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majority believed that the correct comparator to a lesbian was a 
heterosexual male.193  In doing so, Ivy Tech’s sexual orientation 
discrimination does separate Hively into the female group, and, 
thus, sex discrimination occurred.194   
However, in the end, Judge Sykes is the only judge whose 
reasoning accurately corresponds to the conclusion.195  The dissent 
argued that the correct comparator to a lesbian is a gay male 
because only the person’s sex can change.196  For Judge Sykes, the 
formal logic approach dictates that there is only sex discrimination 
if the discriminatory practice separates employees along biological 
sex lines.197  Since sexual orientation is a sex-neutral trait, men 
and women are not separated into two separate groups, and, 
therefore, sex discrimination has not occurred.198  The dissent’s 
comparator falls more squarely within how courts have used the 
anti-classification approach, especially since it reinforces 
traditional concepts of sex.199 
                                                                                                         
note 2, at 1311 (noting that plaintiffs needed to produce opposite 
comparators, i.e., “individuals who are similarly situated to themselves in all 
salient respects aside from biological sex” in order to bring a successful sex 
discrimination claim).   
193 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (stating that the correct 
comparator is a heterosexual male).  
194 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (asserting that the 
discriminatory action did separate on the basis of sex).   
195 Compare supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text (determining, 
according to dissent, that the correct comparator is a gay man not 
heterosexual one), with Franklin, supra note 2, at 1363 (announcing that the 
traditional concept of sex discrimination applies only to situations where 
practices divide men and women into exclusive groups and that Gilbert 
“constructed a history and a pedigree for this idea, suggesting that courts 
had no choice but to interpret Title VII’s prohibitions of sex discrimination 
in a narrow, formalistic, manner if they wished to remain faithful to the 
American legal tradition.”).   
196 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  
197 For further discussion of the dissent’s argument, see supra notes 167–
181 and accompanying text.  
198 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 370 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Sykes, J., dissenting).  
199 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1380 (concluding that the traditional 
concept of sex discrimination continues to serve its original purpose, i.e., 
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Regardless, there is nothing to suggest that the majority’s 
comparator is not equally valid.200  Rather, the majority failed to 
provide an argument for why a heterosexual man was a more apt 
comparator than a gay man.201  Instead of explaining its reasoning, 
the majority immediately shifted to discussing gender-
nonconformity.202  Thus, under the anti-classification approach, as 
understood in Gilbert, sexual orientation discrimination is not sex 
discrimination, and the majority did not provide any explanation as 
to why the comparator’s sexual orientation should change.203      
Under the associational discrimination theory, the majority 
made a very similar argument to the comparative method because 
it still separated the partners into mutually exclusive sex-specific 
groups.204  Consequently, the logic is the same as under the 
comparator method but with the added dimension that the partner, 
not the employee, is a member of the protected class.205 So, just as 
                                                                                                         
limiting sex discrimination’s reach, but that the loss of normative arguments 
prevents ongoing debate into sex discrimination’s interpretation).  Compare 
supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text (determining, according to the 
dissent, that the correct comparator is a gay man not heterosexual one), with 
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (arguing that there is 
no applicable comparator for there is “no question of excluding a disease or 
disability comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or disabilities 
and yet confined to the members of one race or sex.”).  
200 Soucek, supra note 81, at 118.   
201 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (concluding that the comparator is a 
heterosexual man without explaining why sex and sexual orientation may 
change).  For Soucek’s thoughts on determining the comparator, see supra 
note 200 and accompanying text.    
202 See Hively, 853 F.3d at 346 (shifting to gender non-conformity 
perspective while still discussing the comparative method); see also Soucek, 
supra note 81, at 118–19 (alleging that the majority includes two more 
reasons for including sexual orientation discrimination because the 
comparative method lacks weight).   
203 For further discussion of this conclusion, see supra notes 191–202. 
204 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 119 (emphasizing that the associational 
discrimination approach still requires a comparator that divides employees 
into two mutually exclusive groups along sex lines).  See generally supra 
notes 136–141 for majority’s approach to associational discrimination. 
205 Soucek, supra note 81, at 119.  Under race associational discrimination, 
the white partner in an interracial marriage is discriminated against for 
having an African-American partner.  Thus, it is discriminatory against the 
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with the comparative method, the comparator could either be a gay 
or heterosexual man, which still leaves the problem of who is the 
correct comparator.206         
 
B. Taking the Plunge: Sex Stereotyping/Gender Non-
Conformity Approach as Potential New Framework 
To truly protect against sexual orientation discrimination, 
the court needed to discuss the development in societal 
conceptions of sexual orientation to a point where scholars now 
recognize the inherent connections between sexual orientation 
discrimination and sex discrimination.207  The majority almost 
took the leap to view sex discrimination from a social logic 
perspective as opposed to a formal logic approach but failed to 
take the ultimate steps.208 Following the dynamic statutory 
interpretation methodology, the majority recognized the need to 
look at the textual and historical aspects of the Title VII but found 
those perspectives did not provide a clear answer to defining sex 
discrimination.209  The final step the court should have taken is to 
move towards an evolutive perspective wherein the court analyzes 
the statute in light of “its present context, especially the ways in 
                                                                                                         
white partner because, if he was black, then the discriminatory practice 
would not have occurred.  Cf. id. (explaining that if partner had been black 
rather than white, then discrimination would not have occurred because it 
would not be interracial marriage). 
206 Compare supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text (discussing the 
majority’s comparator), with supra notes 173–175  and accompanying text 
(discussing the dissent’s comparator).  
207 Compare Soucek, supra note 81, at 121 (emphasizing that Hively 
mentioned no gender or queer theory scholarship which highlights the 
connection between sexual orientation discrimination and the subordination 
of women), with Franklin, supra note 2, at 1379–80 (noting it is legal fiction 
to think that Title VII could only be interpreted via the anti-classification 
approach and that any other approach would be judicial activism since anti-
classification approach was used in order to reinforce traditional gender 
norms and sexual conventions).  
208 Soucek, supra note 81, at 125–26.  
209 See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text (recounting the Hively 
majority’s reasoning).  
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which the societal and legal environment of the statute has 
materially changed over time.”210  While the court almost took this 
final step in discussing gender non-conformity, the court still 
included the comparator and associational discrimination 
approaches as possible ways to include sexual orientation 
discrimination.211  Moreover, the majority’s discussion of gender 
non-conformity was conclusory and decidedly lacking in analysis 
to back up the conclusions.212   
The majority asserted that being a lesbian is the “ultimate 
case of failure to conform to the female stereotype,” and decided 
to erase the line between gender non-conformity and sexual 
orientation claims.213  However, the court framed the female 
stereotype as “be straight,” which is a sex-neutral trait.214  Thus, on 
its face, both gay men and lesbians can violate the gender norm of 
“be straight,” indicating that the trait would fail the comparator 
approach.215  Instead of changing the framework to a dynamic 
approach, the majority chose to manipulate the anti-classification 
                                                
210 Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1483.   
211 See supra notes 123–127 and notes 136–141 and accompanying text 
(determining that the comparator and associational discrimination 
approaches found sexual orientation discrimination was sex discrimination).   
212 See supra notes 128–135 and accompanying text for majority’s 
discussion of gender non-conformity.  But see Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 
(noting that the majority is blind to substance, i.e. gender and queer theory 
scholarship, which has led the majority to conclude that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a part of sex discrimination).   
213 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 
2017).  For majority’s discussion of gender non-conformity, see supra notes 
128–135 and accompanying text.  
214 Hively, 853 F.3d at 346; see also Soucek, supra note 81, at 118–19 
(arguing that, since heterosexuality is a stereotype that can apply to both 
men and women, it is not a sex-specific trait); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 370 
(Sykes, J., dissenting) (determining that “[s]exual orientation discrimination 
does not classify people according to invidious or idiosyncratic male or 
female stereotypes.  It does not spring from a sex-specific bias at all.”).  
215 For discussion of how heterosexuality is not sex-specific, see supra note 
214; see also note 29  for the definition of the anti-classification approach.  
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approach so that it worked with the majority’s desire to include 
sexual orientation as sex discrimination.216 
 Judge Posner exhibited a willingness to change how courts 
approached sex discrimination but failed to provide sex 
discrimination with the necessary foundation in social logic.217  He 
analogized Title VII with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which has 
been interpreted so as to conform with the relevant economic 
theories.218  He used this analogy to promote updating Title VII 
but did not provide any guidance on what the new framework 
would be.219  Instead of discussing possible frameworks grounded 
in gender and queer theory, he concluded that society now 
understands that gay persons are “normal in the ways that 
count.”220  While his judicial interpretive updating could have 
brought social and normative arguments into interpreting sex 
discrimination, his reasoning, like that of the majority, concluded 
                                                
216 See Soucek supra note 81, at 125 (arguing that the Hively opinions make 
the same errors as the textualist/originalist approach because it “fails to 
observe fully the social realities that give Title VII’s words their meaning.”); 
cf. Eskridge, supra note 36, at 1482 (arguing that “[i]nterpretation is not 
static, but dynamic.  Interpretation is not an archeological discovery, but a 
dialectical creation.  Interpretation is not mere exegesis to pinpoint historical 
meaning, but hermeneutics to apply that meaning to current problems and 
circumstances.”).   
217 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 126 (describing Judge Posner’s opinion as 
“candid and provocative,” but maintaining that it also exhibits “a blindness 
to the sex-specific ways that gender stereotypes involving sexual orientation 
actually operate in the contemporary world.”).     
218 Hively, 853 F.3d at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).   
219 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (arguing that Judge Posner’s Title VII 
updated interpretation stems from his own change in attitude to sexual 
orientation).    
220 Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 355 (Posner, J., concurring) (concluding 
that gay persons “play an essential role” in country and there is social 
interest in protecting them), with Soucek, supra note 81, at 127–28 (arguing 
that Judge Posner relies on his own personal changes in understanding 
sexual orientation as opposed to relying on scholars who study “the 
dynamics of sexual orientation, gender-based stereotyping, and 
subordination”).   
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that sexual orientation falls under sex discrimination but failed to 
tell us why.221    
With judicial interpretive updating, Judge Posner needed to 
take the final step and provide his method with substance.222  By 
engaging with social science theories on sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation, the court could take Price Waterhouse to its next 
natural progression: viewing sexual orientation discrimination as a 
form of sex stereotyping.223  As one commentator on Price 
Waterhouse noted, the Court easily saw the connection between 
sex discrimination and the statements calling the female partner 
“too macho.”224  What the Court failed to realize was why that link 
was easy to make.225  It was easy to make because the justices 
                                                
221 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (commenting that Judge Posner did 
not stick to his analogy and should have looked “to those who have spent 
their careers studying the dynamics of sexual orientation, gender-based 
stereotyping, and subordination.  But these are sources that Judge Posner, 
like his fellow judges in Hively, chose not to see.”).  
222 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 127–28 (arguing that Judge Posner utilizes 
his own autobiographical experiences to make conclusion that sexual 
orientation and sex are connected instead of utilizing sources that study “the 
dynamics of sexual orientation, gender-based stereotyping, and 
subordination”).  Compare Hively, 853 F.3d at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) 
(noting that homosexuality was not a concern of legislatures at time of Title 
VII’s enactment and providing anecdotal evidence of his personal 
experiences stating that “[h]ad I been asked then whether I had ever met a 
male homosexual, I would have answered: probably not; had I been asked 
whether I had ever met a lesbian I would have answered ‘only in the pages 
of A la recherché du temps perdu’”), with Franklin, supra note 2, at 1379 
(noting that Judge Posner did not think sex discrimination should expand to 
sexual orientation discrimination and that he did not think that Title VII 
creates “a federally protected right for male workers to wear nail polish and 
dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high heels” (quoting 
language from Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 
1066 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
223 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (concluding that all of the judges in 
Hively chose not to engage with these types of sources).  
224 Goldberg, supra note 37, at 787.   
225 See id. (arguing that “there is nothing inherent in harassing acts and 
stereotyping statements in general that makes their underlying 
discriminatory intent fundamentally easier to unmask than the 
discriminatory intent that might underlie other types of adverse treatment.  
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shared a common context on the social meaning of those 
statements.226  Therefore, what courts, including the Seventh 
Circuit, need to do is start delving into how our nation’s 
conceptions on sex and sexual orientation have developed and 
changed.227  By engaging in a sociological inquiry, the court can 
add substance to sex discrimination that provides an actual 
rationale for their decisions as opposed to conclusory statements 
that sexual orientation discrimination falls under sex 
discrimination.228  Courts, understandably, are wary of engaging in 
this sort of inquiry because of charges that the courts are 
formulating their social views into legal rules.229  One way to 
combat this judicial legitimacy issue is for courts to rely on experts 
in the fields of sex, gender, and sexual orientation to provide them 
with an updated social context.230  While experts can create more 
power imbalances in court due to their high costs, their strategic 
use as advocates for viewing sexual orientation discrimination as a 
form of sex discrimination can shift courts’ reliance on 
                                                                                                         
Instead, it is agreement (or presumed agreement) on the social meaning of 
those acts and statements, when considered through a contextual lens, that 
renders the cases easy for courts to decide.”). 
226 Id.  
227 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 116 (highlighting that the Hively opinions 
do not mention any antidiscrimination or gender theorist, legal historian, or 
gay rights advocate, which ends up creating an opinion that offers “an 
originalism without history, a dynamic interpretation that lacks a limiting 
principle, and a textualism largely disengaged from the values Title VII’s 
text is best understood to promote”); see also Eskridge, supra note 36, at 
1482–83 (positing that judges should recognize that interpretation is 
applying meaning to a current context and that, while textual and historical 
perspectives are important factors, how the social and legal environment has 
changed over time is also a factor).  
228 See Soucek, supra note 81, at 128 (determining that advocates need to 
highlight gender policing that links sexual orientation discrimination with 
sex discrimination); cf. Goldberg, supra note 37, at 740 (proposing that 
courts have favored the comparator approach because of judicial legitimacy 
issues, and, thus, courts refuse to make sociologically oriented inquires).   
229 Goldberg, supra note 37, at 793.  
230 See id. at 797 (suggesting that using experts would legitimize court 
decisions and help courts themselves update their ability to discern 
discrimination).  
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comparators to a reliance on social science data.231  In doing so, 
experts could periodically update the courts with developments in 
social science, but this would no longer be necessary for every 
case because courts would rely on the social science data.232          
 
V.  CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER: HIVELY’S IMPACT ON THE 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DEBATE 
While Hively represents a shift in the sex discrimination 
debate, the conflicting opinions from both the judicial and 
executive branch create confusion for employers and employees 
about discrimination in the work place and uncertainty for the 
courts about how to identify sex discrimination.233  Hively 
provided an answer to the issue of sexual orientation 
discrimination but did not provide an adequate framework in 
which to analyze future cases, creating future difficulty for the 
courts in how to apply the holding in other sexual orientation 
cases.234 Moreover, sticking to the anti-classification framework 
                                                
231 See generally id. at 798–800 (conceding some issues with using experts, 
but also recognizing potential middle ground where experts are necessary 
sporadically in order to update the judiciary on social science 
developments).  
232 Cf. id. at 800 (explaining how family responsibilities discrimination 
(FRD) advocates used experts, popular culture, and social science data to 
ease courts into seeing the link between family responsibilities and sex in 
order to reach point where link “can be seen easily and without any special 
training”).  
233 Blair Druhan Bullock, What to Do with the Federal Government's 
Internally Inconsistent Interpretations of Title VII, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 17, 
2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=db7c183b-0f4b-
46a7-8455-2abd064c4ed2.  See generally White, supra note 82 (illustrating 
the EEOC’s struggle with interpretive authority and how the courts and 
executive branch enter into interpretive debate).  
234 See supra notes 182–221 and accompanying text for discussion of 
Hively’s framework and its limitations.  Compare Jessica Mason Pieklo, 
Roberts Court Kicks the Can on Employment Discrimination Based on 
Sexual Orientation, REWIRE (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://rewire.news/article/2017/12/12/roberts-court-kicks-can-employment-
discrimination-sexual-orientation/ (reporting that Supreme Court declined to 
hear case of employment discrimination against lesbian and noting that 
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may prevent new potential types of sex discrimination claims from 
emerging.235  Thus, courts will continue to use the traditional anti-
classification framework that will prevent new understandings of 
sex discrimination from taking hold in the legal context.236  In 
                                                                                                         
lower courts are split on sexual orientation discrimination), with Alison 
Frankel, How Trump’s DOJ’s About-Face on LGBT Workplace Bias Could 
Backfire at SCOTUS, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2017) 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-otc-lgbt/how-trump-dojs-about-face-on-
lgbt-workplace-bias-could-backfire-at-scotus-idUKKCN1BM2DD 
(reporting that LBGT group Lambda Legal hopes the Supreme Court will 
take up the issue because both the EEOC and Department of Justice enforce 
Title VII), Joanna L. Grossman & Anthony Michael Kreis, Unsolicited 
Opinion: The Department of Justice Files Brief Urging Court to Block 
Rights for LGBT Employees, JUSTIA (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2017/08/01/unsolicited-opinion-department-
justice-files-brief-urging-court-block-rights-lgbt-employees (reporting that 
Attorney General Sessions filed brief for Zarda arguing against sexual 
orientation claims under Title VII), Erin Mulvaney, Government Agencies to 
Clash in Upcoming Case on Sexual Orientation, THE NATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL (Sept. 21, 2017), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202798551263/Government-
Agencies-To-Clash-In-Upcoming-Case-On-Sexual-Orientation (noting that 
2d Circuit will hear from both the EEOC and Department of Justice in 
Zarda), Brian Tashman, 6 Questions for Trump’s EEOC Nominees: Will 
LGBT, Disability, and Women’s Rights Be Protected?, ACLU (Sept. 18, 
2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/6-questions-trumps-eeoc-
nominees-will-lgbt-disability-and-womens-rights-be (recommending that 
senators ask nominees about whether sexual orientation discrimination is a 
form of sex discrimination). 
235 See Goldberg, supra note 37, at 812 (concluding that the comparator 
methodology “has foreclosed most discrimination claims and, further, 
shrunk the very idea of discrimination, both truncating traditional 
discrimination jurisprudence and all but guaranteeing that second-generation 
discrimination theories will not translate into law”).  
236 See Franklin, supra note 2, at 1315 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
adopted the anti-classification concept of sex discrimination which limited 
its scope and insulated from courts other employment regulations that 
maintained social stratification); cf. Allison E. Maue, 11th Circuit: Sexual 
Orientation is Not Actionable Under Title VII, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW 
(March 30, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/11th-circuit-
sexual-orientation-discrimination-not-actionable-under-title-vii (reporting 
 
DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L. VOLUME 7, NUMBER II 




turn, discriminated individuals, under non-traditional types of sex 
discrimination, will have a low probability of success in court and 
the very meaning of sex discrimination will remain narrow and 
static.237   
Regardless, with some courts protecting against sexual 
orientation discrimination, some states enacting their own sexual 
orientation discrimination laws, and the potential for the Supreme 
Court to weigh in on the issue, employers should start 
implementing employment practices that advocate against sexual 
orientation discrimination.238  Various commentators suggest that 
employers should be proactive and adopt a “common 
denominator” approach, where employers provide all employees 
the same protections with specific policies addressing how 
employees should report discrimination and harassment.239  
Moreover, employees who wish to bring a valid sexual orientation 
                                                                                                         
that the 11th Circuit in Evans v. Ga. Regional Hospital held that sexual 
orientation is not actionable under Title VII because of binding precedent).     
237 Goldberg, supra note 37, at 734.   
238 See Druhan Bullock, supra note 233 (noting the different positions from 
the EEOC, DOJ, and courts while also highlighting that at least 20 states 
currently prohibit sexual orientation discrimination through state statutes).  
239 See Allison Waterfield, Gender Transitioning in the Workplace: 
Employer Obligations and Best Practices, BLOOMBERG BNA L. & EMP. 
BLOG (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/gender-transitioning-
workplace-b73014472559/ (recommending that employers give gender 
transitioning policies full weight as opposed to suggestions, respect privacy 
and confidentiality, work with employees on transition plans, create 
adequate recordkeeping documents, and designate someone as point of 
contact); see also Allison L. Goico & Hayley Geiler, Supreme Court Leaves 
The Issue of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Unresolved, THE NATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-leaves-issue-sexual-
orientation-discrimination-unresolved (advising employers to stay up-to-
date on applicable laws and to maintain policies that prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination including mechanisms for reporting and 
investigation); cf. EEOC, What You Should Know About EEOC and the 
Enforcement Protections or LGBT Workers, EEOC NEWSROOM, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement_protections_lgbt_
workers.cfm#training (last visited April 7, 2018) (providing information on 
the relevant law as well as training, outreach, and resources for employers).   
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discrimination case should first look to see if their state has a 
separate statute covering sexual orientation discrimination.240  If 
not, they should consider filing with the EEOC who will 
investigate the case and determine if there is cause to file the 
lawsuit.241  However, the EEOC’s position, while influential, is not 
entitled to deference in the federal courts.242  As such, whether an 
employee is able to sustain a valid sex discrimination claim is 
dependent upon the circuit in which the complaint is filed.243        
Using Hively as momentum, individuals are trying to 
overturn precedent in other circuits and are attempting to have the 
Supreme Court weigh in on the issue.244  Notably, the Second 
Circuit in Zarda v. Altitude Express, where a skydiving instructor 
brought a Title VII claim against his employer alleging that he was 
fired because he was gay, recently became the second circuit court 
to determine that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of 
sex discrimination.245  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has 
ultimately refused to hear arguments on the matter.246  However, if 
                                                
240 See EEOC, supra note 239 (explaining the process for protecting against 
sexual orientation discrimination including applicable laws and how the 
EEOC enforces Title VII). 
241 Id.  
242 See Druhan Bullock, supra note 233 (explaining that federal courts are 
not required to follow EEOC’s opinion and that federal courts are bound by 
their respective precedent). 
243 Id.  
244 See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(deciding that sexual orientation discrimination is not a form of sex 
discrimination because of precedent), vacat’d & remanded, 2018 WL 
1040820 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018).   
245 Zarda, 2018 WL 1040820, at *20 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018); see also Laura 
Lawless Robertson, Title VII Bars Sexual Orientation Discrimination, Says 
US Second Circuit Court of Appeals, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Feb. 26, 
2018), https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/title-vii-bars-sexual-
orientation-discrimination-says-second-circuit-court-of-appeals-us/ 
(reporting on the 2nd Circuit’s decision and explaining the court’s three 
reasonings: (1) sex is necessarily factor of sexual orientation, (2) sexual 
orientation discrimination is based on gendered assumptions, and (3) sexual 
orientation discrimination is a form of associational discrimination).   
246 See Chris Johnson, Supreme Court won’t hear case seeking Title VII 
protection for gays, WASH. BLADE (Dec. 11, 2017), 
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other circuits continue to follow in the Seventh Circuit’s footsteps, 
there will be an increasing need for the Supreme Court to step 
in.247  Otherwise, employers will remain unsure of how to 
adequately comply with Title VII, especially for employers that 
operate within multiple jurisdictions.248  With employers and 
employees unsure about the validity of their claims, courts and the 
EEOC will probable experience increased litigation.249  
 
VI. WHERE ARE WE NOW: STEPS TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Sex discrimination started off as a forum in which to 
debate concepts of sex, gender, and stereotypes, but the Supreme 
Court quickly cut off that debate, opting for a clear-cut “objective” 
approach, effectively silencing any development in what sex 
discrimination covered.250  Regardless, the Supreme Court slowly 
added additional types of claims to sex discrimination.251  In 
adding gender non-conformity as a potential avenue for sex 
discrimination, the Court opened the door to sexual orientation 
                                                                                                         
http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/12/11/supreme-court-wont-hear-
case-seeking-title-vii-protection-for-gays/ (explaining that the Supreme 
Court denied writ of certiorari after the 11th Circuit held that sexual 
orientation did not fall under Title VII).  
247 See Robertson, supra note 245 (positing that the Supreme Court may be 
more open to hearing the issue now that three circuits have weighed in on 
the matter); see also Louis L. Chodoff et al., The Split Deepens: 2nd Circuit 
Holds that Title VII Bans Sexual Orientation Discrimination, THE 
NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/split-deepens-2nd-circuit-holds-title-
vii-bans-sexual-orientation-discrimination (arguing that the Supreme Court 
has more incentive to weigh in on the issue).   
248 See Robertson, supra note 245 (highlighting that employers need to 
review local laws to ensure their policies comport with them); see also 
supra note 239 (providing advice on what employers should do).   
249 See supra note 241 and accompanying text for discussion of what 
employees should do.  
250 See supra notes 44–56 and accompanying text for discussion of Title 
VII’s historical debate on sex discrimination.  
251 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text for discussion of Supreme 
Court decisions on sex discrimination.   
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discrimination claims.252  However, courts were quick to shut that 
door because these claims were in contention with how courts 
have traditionally approached sex discrimination.253  The Seventh 
Circuit was the first circuit court to decide that sexual orientation 
discrimination was a form of sex discrimination, but the court still 
held onto the formalist approach that prevented developments in 
courts’ understanding of what sex discrimination means.254  
Rather, the court should have relied on the gender non-conformity 
method and coupled it with developments in social science and in 
our nation’s understanding of how sex and sexual orientation are 
connected.255  In doing so, the court would have been able to 
provide a much more persuasive reasoning for their decision.256  A 
reasoning that would supply other courts, including the Supreme 
Court, with the necessary arguments to hold that sexual orientation 
discrimination is, in fact, a form of sex discrimination.257     
 
                                                
252 See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text for discussion of how 
lower courts struggled with separating gender nonconformity and sexual 
orientation discrimination.   
253 See supra note 75 and accompanying text for discussion of courts 
refusing to listen to gender non-conformity cases if they involved a sexual 
orientation component.    
254 See supra notes 90–181 and accompanying text for discussion of Hively 
decision; see also supra notes 182–206 and accompanying text for 
discussion of how majority held onto the formalist approach.     
255 See supra notes 207–232 and accompanying text for argument that social 
science and the gender non-conformity method create a method that aligns 
with sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.    
256 See supra notes 222–232 and accompanying text for argument that 
court’s analysis would have been more persuasive if it utilized different 
framework. 
257 See supra notes 233–249 and accompanying text for discussion of 
Hively’s impact on future cases.  
